T houghts and things are becoming increasingly entangled in the humanities. Recent developments in philosophy such as actor-network theory, speculative realism, and object-oriented ontology have reanimated things in ways that challenge the textual bias of humanities scholarship.
1 Literary scholars have also turned their attention to things and their involvements, supplementing hermeneutics with new modes of reading, from distant to surface, cognitive to descriptive. 2 Things have affirmed or denied themselves in our thinking, shedding new light on matters of materiality, politics, ontology, and realism. As Steven Connor writes, "Thinking, which is properly nothing and nowhere, can only lay hold of itself in the form a thing," and thus "when we think about things, we may perhaps also always be thinking about the kinds of thinking that things are and allow" ("Thinking Things," par. 1). In the wake of the so-called speculative turn, thinking involves thinking things over, thinking about the forms of thinking that things "are and allow," and speculating on the fortunes and hazards of their strange realities.
Confronted by this latest recursion of things in history, literary scholars find themselves in a position similar to that of Basil March, the "philosophical observer" in William Dean Howells's A Hazard of New Fortunes, composed and serialized across thirty-four installments in Harper's Weekly between 23 March and 16 November 1889 (412).
3 "Now you think this thing over, March, and let me know the last of next week," Fulkerson says in the novel's opening sentence, the first of many self-conscious allusions to "this thing" at the novel's center (7): the experimental magazine whose founding and "fortunes," Howells wrote to his father, "form the plot, such as there is" (Selected Letters 241). In the first chapter alone, Howells refers to "this thing"-or "the thing"-on more than fifteen separate occasions, setting the stage for a novel philosophically attuned to what Bill Brown has recently described as the distinction "between objects and things-or the object and its thingness" (19) . 4 This "object-thing dialectic" finds expression in Howells's novel through the inherent potential of the thing to exceed its representational status, confirming Brown's argument that "a focus on objects alone will not disclose the potency of the object qua thing," particularly in literary works that "transpose the object into some other thing that is . . . in excess of any manifest object" (5). While Howells presents the thing as a cultural object with historical reference-the kind of literary magazine that aspires to what Brad Evans describes as "aesthetic chicness" (803) 5 -he also transposes its speculative foundation into "some other thing" that cannot be reduced to its representational and signifying dimensions. Understanding the thing exclusively as an object erases "the thingness that inheres as a potentiality within [it] ," foreclosing the novel's openness to more speculative (and less objectified) modes of building, dwelling, and thinking with things and their involvements (Brown 5) .
While parsing the difference between object and thing may seem trivial, drawing such distinction is a prerequisite for revealing the otherness inherent within a given object. Howells makes a similar distinction in the opening of his novel by focalizing the thing through Basil's consciousness: to distinguish its speculative enterprise from the product itself, and to dramatize how Basil's thinking becomes entangled with the otherness of the thing he comes to serve as editor, apprentice, and "philosophical observer" (412). For the first five chapters, the thing creeps into Basil's consciousness and exerts its agency, connecting him to the fortunes and hazards of its speculative thingness. "If the thing succeeds, you'll share in its success," Fulkerson promises. But only if he consciously takes hold of it, committing himself to dwelling with its potentiality: "To come down to business with you, March, I sha'n't start this thing unless I can get you to take hold of it" (7, 11) . With characteristic irony, Howells mediates the thing through the language of advertising, using his writing to take hold of the reader just as the thing takes hold of Basil. The thingness of the speculative project begins to physically mark Basil's thinking with doubts and dashes: "if I had my heart set on this thing-Fulkerson always calls it 'this thing'-I would cheerfully accept any sacrifice you could make to it," he tells his wife; and later, "if I do this thing-Fulkerson again! I can't get away from 'this thing'; it's ominous-I must do it because I want to do it" (29, 30) . By the novel's second installment, the thing has stolen into Basil's consciousness and redirected it to New York, refracting the structure of his thought through its speculative existence-in all its fortunes and hazards.
As the thing takes hold of Basil, the novel also takes hold of the reader, drawing them into the fictional and serialized structure of its thingly existence. It is precisely this power to "take hold" of the reader that first attracted William James's interest in the novel, leading him to describe A Hazard of New Fortunes-along with his brother's "Tragic Muse" and his own "Psychology"-as one of 1890's most "memorable" works. "You've done it this time and no mistake!" he wrote to Howells in August 1890, " [I] can hardly recollect a novel that has taken hold of me like the latter. . . . The steady unflagging flow of it is something wonderful" (Letters 298, my emphasis). He is likely referring here to the novel's panoramic scope, as well as how it focalizes events through a literary and philosophical perspective, drawing on the editorial passivity of Basil's consciousness as a means of phenomenological reflection. Through Basil, Howells is able to animate an "object-thing dialectic" inherent in James's philosophy that "There are two ways of knowing things, knowing them immediately or intuitively, and knowing them conceptually or representatively" ("Knowing of Things" 107). By focalizing the thing from an editorial middle, Howells thus discloses the novel's thingly foundation as both a representable object and as "some other thing" that emerges "in excess" of its representational dimensions (Brown 5) . Here, the thing becomes not only a cultural object with historical reference, but also something that possesses a singular thingness that withdraws from attempts to represent it.
The recent speculative turn in philosophy offers a new context in which to understand Howells's novel. In response to the cultural and linguistic emphasis of much late-twentieth-century philosophy, a loosely bound group of philosophers have begun to explore the possibilities of thinking things outside the anthropocentric contexts of twentieth-century philosophy, specifically culture and language. What unites these philosophers is "an allergy to 'the real' that is characteristic of its more linguistic or discursive forms," and its desire to speculate on the strange realities of things that escape and elude traditional humanist thinking (Coole and Frost 6) . While the desire for non-linguistic contact with the real can also be found in thing theory, the speculative turn has renewed interest in matters of ontology that are irreducible to literary categories such as signification, textuality, and discourse. 6 Unfortunately, one effect of the speculative wager has been to limit discussions of realism to the realm of philosophy, thereby marginalizing how literature and other arts "provide particularly salient sites for redemptive reification," as Brown writes, spurring "the retrieval of thingness from the blur of habit" and the abstraction of philosophical discourse (292).
7 A common blind spot of speculative philosophers is the diverse history of literary works in which language and form self-consciously liberate things from representation and reveal the real in all its uncanny strangeness.
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Graham Harman's recent article on the possibilities of an "objectoriented literary criticism" is one of the few attempts to address literature from the perspective of "object-oriented ontology," a popular variant of speculative realism. Harmon speculates that an object-oriented literary criticism would allow scholars to consider how literary works resist textual dissolution, rather than proliferate textual surplus: "What object-oriented philosophy hopes to offer is not a method, but a countermethod," a way of reading that "instead of dissolving a text upward into its readings or downward into its cultural elements," would focus "specifically on how [a text] resists such dissolution" (200). Such criticism would retune reading for a world "in which real individual objects"-including real literary works-"resist all forms of causal or cognitive mastery" (188). Focusing on singularities that exceed textuality, Harman argues, would activate the potential of literary works to exert political, historical, and ontological agency, providing a means to "look at how works reverse or shape what might have been expected in their time and place, or how some withstand the earthquakes of the centuries much better than others" (201). In contrast with Bruno Latour's actor-network theory-a realism founded on the premise that things have no existence beyond their entanglements-object-oriented criticism attempts to re-ground realism in what Harman describes as a "deeply non-relational conception of the reality of things . . . a frank realism which views objects or things as genuine realities deeper than any of the relations in which they might become involved" (195) . Instead of tracing a thing's connections within a network, it works to accord the thing its own thingness, animating how its reality withdraws into the shadows of any attempt to bring it into light.
Harman's essay curiously omits any specific reading of a literary text. Instead, he restricts himself to theory, commenting broadly on schools of criticism (New Criticism, New Historicism, Deconstruction) without ever engaging the concrete details of a literary work. In this respect, his essay confirms Brown's observation that speculative philosophy, when compared with literature and the arts, often fails to illustrate things in ways that are historically concrete. While Harman pays lip service to the singularity of literary works as objects of theory, he delivers his argument in a way that evacuates literature of its specific historicity. Here too the essay confirms Brown's general assessment of the speculative turn:
One limit of today's philosophical interest in the 'permanent strangeness of objects' is that it stabilizes both objects and strangeness and thus can hardly hope to tell you what is strange here, strange now, or what was strange there and then. The task of dramatizing the thingness of objects-here and now, there and then-is rarely the task of theory, let alone of philosophy. It is the task of art. (39) It is one thing to theorize that literary works are founding sites of history, turning reality around, upside down, and inside out through the ontology of their speculative foundation. It is quite another to draw out and animate this turning, dramatizing the process by which specific literary works render the familiar strange and activate the "thingness that inheres as a potentiality within [them]" (Brown 5) . Speculative philosophy neglects the artistic drama that renders such a "countermethod" practical, ignoring the poetic sites in which readers dwell with the formal thingness of literary works.
Brown emphasizes that animating this strangeness begins with the Heideggerian premise-articulated in "The Origin of the Work of Art"-that we can "never know thingness directly," "only vaguely," since only art discloses "the thingly character of the thing" (Heidegger 67; Brown 28) . In other words, only the work of art itself, not the work of art in theory, can dramatize thingness in a way that unsettles the familiar and allows us to see "what is strange here, strange now, or what was strange there and then" (Brown 39) . Even Harman acknowledges the debt he owes Heidegger on this point: he describes object-oriented ontology as "as an attempt, within the broader framework of speculative realism, to come to terms with phenomenology and its radicalization at the hands of Heidegger" (186) . 9 Heidegger's philosophy thus provides a middle path between Brown and Harman that attends to both the "object-thing dialectic" and the ontology of foundations, specifically as it relates to building, dwelling, and thinking with things and the realisms they construct. 10 In their dual capacity as both things and speculations, literary works are the origin of their own realities and ontologies, shaping history through the formal and fictional ground of their thingness.
While Howells may not be the most likely candidate for a speculative reading, his phenomenological attention to "the thing" in Hazard creates a literary work whose speculative fortunes unsettle the conventional paradigm of realism during its time. Furthermore, by dramatizing Basil's changing relationship to "the thing," Howells offers readers both a critique and reappraisal of realism at the turn of the century, one that exorcises realism of its pictorial logic in order to reshape its engagement with the panoramic periodicity inherent within the modern metropolis. At a time when the logic of representation threatened to incorporate things into fixed pictures, Howells began to reimagine realism by conferring upon his work a more open relationship with the political thingness of history-"here and now, there and then" (Brown 39 ).
"A man without a 'method'" Most studies of Howells are typically framed by his theories of realism, his defense of the commonplace, and his infamous "timidity and gentility" that Sinclair Lewis once blamed for taming Mark Twain. As the so-called "Dean" of literary realism in the United States, Howells is not usually read for his philosophical nuance-even if there is much in that vein to uncover. The general approach of most Howells scholarship ignores, for example, the substantial role of periodicals in constituting Howells's work and laying the foundation for its structure and circulation.
11 Throughout his career, Howells cultivated editorial spaces that allowed him to build and dwell in the public-"the space of appearance," as Hannah Arendt describes it-while thinking seriously about the political, phenomenological, and public foundations of literary culture (199) . Few figures were so devoted to periodicals and so praised for their editorial hospitality. 12 As Ellery Sedgwick notes, Howells's "most important editorial achievement" was not his promotion of realism but "his support in the form of generative literary counsel, responsive sympathy, frequent publication, and authoritative critical praise for younger regional and realistic writers across the country" (159). Whether serving as the editor of the Atlantic or the "unreal editor" of Harper's, Howells played a critical role in mediating the conditions for a literary polis in which different things, perspectives, and regions were allowed to publicly gather and circulate, giving rise to new encounters and exchanges.
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A similar hospitality imbues Howell's method of composition, which he often describes in phenomenological terms by placing himself in medias res where things are allowed to assemble freely and spontaneously. In an interview with Van Wyck Brooks, for example, Brooks learns that "Mr. Howells is, in fact, a man without a 'method'," or an author who patiently sits at his desk and passively observes phenomena as they appear and develop. "Do you ever find that you have lost yourself in your work, that your characters get the better of you, that your own feelings become entangled?" Brooks asks. "Never," Howells replies, "The essence of achievement is to keep outside, to be entirely dispassionate, as a sculptor must be, moulding his clay" (Brooks 11548) . In a later lecture, Howells describes realism as a phenomenological balancing act "in which all things shall appear in their very proportion and relation," a definition that further underscores his hospitality to things and their involvements ("Novel-Writing" 228). Throughout his work, a phenomenological side to his thinking resists the objectifying logic of representation and draws attention to spaces of appearance in which things gather and reveal themselves, giving rise to the thingly structure of the polis and the public. In these founding spaces-or what Henry Blake Fuller once called "the great middle stratum" of Howells's work (162)-Howells's speculative interest in building and dwelling with the public, the polis, and its periodical forms becomes evident.
No work in Howells's canon foregrounds this interest more vividly than A Hazard of New Fortunes, a novel that continues to be read almost exclusively as a failed or successful picture of the modern city in realist form.
14 To date, scholars have largely followed Amy Kaplan's reading of the novel as a representation that contains difference by drawing lines across the city in order "to combat its otherness and to fix its protean changes within a coherent narrative form" (47, 44). With few exceptions, scholars have neglected the sprawling "thing" at its center.
15 Most interpret the novel in the context of literary realism, ignoring the fact that Howells actually developed its form in response to the pictorial limits of realism. "Most attempts to assemble [the city] in our pictures are failures," he wrote in 1888, "possibly it is too transitory, too intangible in its nature with us, to be truthfully represented as really existent" ("Editor's Study" 964). Upon completing the novel, he even looked back on its composition in awe of the centrifugal forces that unsettled realist containment:
A Hazard of New Fortunes was not the first novel I had written with the printer at my heels, but it was the first which took its own time to prescribe its own dimensions. I had the general design well in mind before I began to write it, but as it advanced it compelled into its course incidents, interests, individualities, which I had not known lay near, and it specialized and amplified at points which I had not intended. ("Autobiographical" 504)
His solution was to gather this variety around the speculative development of Every Other Week, allowing its fortunes and hazards to "form the plot, such as there is" (Selected Letters 241).
While scholars have drawn attention to Every Other Week-specifically how it accounts for the fact that "everything seems to be flying off," as John W. Crowley writes-to date no one has approached the magazine as a thing with its own formal and fictional reality (18) . Those who mention it focus exclusively on its signifying dimensions, reducing the thing exclusively to an object with a name, identity, and cultural context. In doing so, they neglect the process by which its thingness endows the novel with its uncanny strangeness, specifically how it turns and transposes the metropolis into a speculative polis that combats the instrumentality of order and representation. It is precisely this turning that renders Hazard historically exceptional, investing it with a radical thingness that, in Harman's words, "works to reverse or shape what might have been expected in [its] time and place" (201).
The Apartment Hunt
When Basil finally agrees to become editor of "the thing," Howells turns the novel to New York and inaugurates the infamous apartment hunt, which dramatizes "the uprooting and transplanting" of the Marches from their relative comfort in Boston to the "anxieties that beset" their settlement in the "vast wilderness" of New York (37, 39, 44) . Modeled after Howells's own transition to New York, the "disproportionate length" of the apartment hunt unfolds into what Adam Gopnik calls "a consuming activity in itself, self-propelling, self-defining," in which the reader witnesses the Marches moving from apartment to apartment, endlessly searching for a place to dwell ("Hazard" 565).
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The result is neither settlement nor adaptation, but disorientation-a state of homelessness produced by the logic of incorporation that Alan Trachtenberg describes as "the hidden purpose of cities" at the turn of the century (139). Unable to escape, Basil finds himself plagued by the "nightmare of flat-hunting" in his sleep: "Now we're imprisoned in the present and we have to make the worst of it," he observes to his wife. The fortune of the thing has surrendered to its hazardous reification: "it was of a hideous thing with two square eyes and a series of sections growing darker and then lighter," Howells writes, refracting the Marches' search through the logic of a nightmare (62, 60, 62) .
In the midst of disorientation, Howells temporarily turns away from the thing toward the broader question of building and dwelling (how things are structured, confronted, and revealed). By throwing the question of dwelling into relief, the apartment hunt recalls Heidegger's distinction between dwelling as a physical phenomenon and dwelling as an ontological condition. In his late essay "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger demonstrates how "the real dwelling plight" exists not in the physical shortage of buildings or apartments, but in the metaphysical truth "that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell" (159). In the midst of this search, dwelling is thus "the end that presides over all building," the open clearing through which all other things and foundations are built, "safeguard[ing] each thing in its nature" (144, 147). To dwell means to care, spare, and preserve: "The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving," since it clears the space for things to emerge on their own ground (147). In short, dwelling liberates things from instrumentality by preserving the potentiality inherent to their thingly existence.
It is precisely such dwelling that Basil and his wife fail to secure in chapters six through ten. This failure is most visible in the object that captures and contains their apartment hunt: the "glittering nondescript vertebrate" assembled by Isabel to hold the advertisements and agent permits that structure their search, mapping their movements from flat to flat (42). As an object its own right, the vertebrate embodies what Sämi Ludwig describes as a "representational scaffold" that locks and imprisons their actions in its pictorial frame (114). "She made March buy her the Herald and the World," Howells writes, "and she added to its spiny convolutions from them. She read the new advertisements aloud with ardor and with faith to believe that the apartments described in them were every one truthfully represented, and that any one of them was richly responsive to their needs" (53). Blinded by her faith in representation-"every one [was] truthfully represented"-Isabel clings to the "vertebrate" as a "responsive guide" to "their needs," watching helplessly as it forecloses their search within a grid organized by reference and correspondence.
The vertebrate functions almost like a metonymy for the logic of representation critiqued by Heidegger in "The Age of the World Picture" (1938) . Similar to the "skeleton" or "framework" of Gestell (enframing), the vertebrate reduces the metropolis to a representational grid that forecloses the potentiality of things to reveal themselves in ways that resist their objectification. Within this grid, things are represented as "standing-reserve" and thus become captured by the cycle of production and consumption. Drawing on the original German for representation-Vorstellen (to put something in front of something else)-Heidegger traces this pictorial logic back to the string of terms associated with Gestell, which includes all the stellan words commonly translated as "to order, to represent, to secure, to entrap, to disguise, to produce, to present, to supply" (Ulmer 15). All of these actions occlude the possibility of speculation by re-presenting things in a framework organized by mastery and control. Indeed, das Gestell carries a literal meaning akin to "skeleton" or "framework"-much like a vertebrate that converts things into resources and forecloses more conjectural forms of existence.
Howells also felt this crisis of representation personally during the composition of Hazard. Three weeks before its serialization, he and his wife Elinor suffered the tragic death of their daughter Winny, a loss that he later described in language similar to the opening of his novel: "It is not a thing to dwell on," he wrote in his "Autobiographical" note to Hazard, "it is a universal thing and it is only when it comes to one's self that one fully realizes the human bond" (509). As with the novel's opening chapters, Howells's use of the word "thing" here allows him to describe something that resists the attempt to represent it. While likely unconscious, his invocation of "thing" provides him with a clearing in language that liberates the tragic event from objectification, safeguarding both its unspeakable reality and the indelible effect that it had on his life and work. "The stress of it cannot be told," Howells writes, "what may be told is that it had its effect in the formlessness of the passages following the opening, or rather their disproportionate length" (510-11). In addition to defying representation, the thing unsettles the form and structure of his work, exerting its force on his own search for dwelling-both in fiction and in real life. As Howells later explained to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, "you are quite right in your criticism of the opening passages, long stretches of carpentry where I arrived at little or nothing of the real edifice. I may tell you that they were done when we were losing, when we lost, our Winny, and that I was writing in the stress because I must. Afterwards I could not change them. Cosa fatta capo ha" (qtd. in Cady 99). Instead of rebuilding from scratch, he let the "formlessness" of the opening speak for itself, marking his novel with a symptom of his own crisis. While the reality of the thing had its effect, the "long stretches of carpentry" it produced never arrived at the work's "real edifice"-never arrived, that is, at the real foundation on which the novel's fortunes were finally constructed. Like the Marches' failed search, Howells's crisis of representation exposes how the essence of dwelling involves the sparing of things against their objectification. He too had to learn how to dwell with things on their own terms, free from the false security provided by frameworks of closure and representation. "The Real Edifice"
As the novel moves past the apartment hunt, Howells continues to exploit the object-thing dialectic by drawing attention to the thing's formal and speculative potential, which Fulkerson compares to the founding spirit inherent to political revolution: "The thing was a new departure in magazines; it amounted to something in literature as radical as the American Revolution in politics: it was the idea of self government in the arts; and it was this idea that had never yet been fully developed in regard to it" (213). While clearly marked by "the art of the adsmith," Fulkerson's description nevertheless underscores the agency of the magazine as a founding site for revolution, constitution, and self-government through which something radically new in literature might develop. 17 In this capacity, the political nature of the thing turns the novel into not only what Gopnik describes as the "story of the launch of every new magazine-or dot.com-in Manhattan," but also into a literary reflection on the problem of political foundations (qtd. in Clark 13). As such, Howells's politics in Hazard cannot be reduced to the novel's cultural and signifying dimensions, but must also include Howells's relationship to the political itself, or what Hannah Arendt calls "the space of appearance" through which the public and the polis are periodically revealed (199). The political essence of the thing in Hazard lies in its potential to turn and transpose the polis into something no longer contained by the metropolis and its objectification ("metropolis" semantically binds the polis to the metro, whereas torn loose from the prefix, the polis circulates as something more open to speculation).
"The thing," again, is not an object of representation. As Heidegger observes, "The thingly character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object," but in the clearing that it founds and circulates ("The Thing" 165). For Heidegger, the thing clears a space for speculation and construction. " [Things] are locations that allow spaces," he writes, "[which] is why building, by virtue of constructing locations, is a founding and joining of spaces" ("Building" 156). Howells too ultimately leaves the content of the thing empty. By not describing the magazine's representative content, he draws attention to how it gathers and connects spaces while infusing the novel with a temporality that destabilizes representation. It is through the thing that Howells's work assembles people into relation and generates links and connections. Indeed, by the time the first advance copy appears in print, the thing has already acquired its own positive agency. Looking it over, Basil "indulged his admiration of it the more freely because he had not only not written it, but in a way had not edited it. To be sure, he had chosen all the material, but he had not voluntarily put it all together for that number; it had largely put itself together, as every number of every magazine does, and as it seems more and more to do, in the experience of every editor" (196) . What draws Basil's attention here is the thing's potential to self-generate: to freely "put itself together" on its own terms. "It would prosper on no ground but its own," Basil reflects, and "the fact that it was neither exactly a book nor a magazine ought to be for it and not against it, since it would invade no other field" (199). It is a thing whose thingness defies comparison. Whatever fortunes and hazards it creates, it does so on the grounds of its own speculation, grounds that "invade no other field" and are irreducible to any one single object: book or magazine.
Howells invites the reader to not only witness the thing as it eludes representation, but also as it structures phenomena around something that is "too transitory" in its essence "to be truthfully represented as really existent" ("Editor's Study" 964). Free from the pictorial limits of realism, the thing allows Howells's work to expand the polis around the development of periodic sites where people and things gather into open and contested relation. Even the thing's title, Every Other Week, "implies a dialogic component" that unsettles representation, "turning the temporal progression of weeks into a relationship of 'other' [that] puts the different issues into a relationship of encounter," as Sämi Ludwig observes (111). With "time as one of its ingredients," the periodical inherently loosens the novel from the fixity of representation by suggesting "a constant revision of representation," or a periodicity that liberates speculative thought from the "very atemporality of the medium of 'vision' itself" (Ludwig 111) . Given the thing's dialogic and temporal openness, its speculative thingness has the effect of turning realism inside out, transposing the magazine into "some other thing" in excess of any literary object or representation.
This thingness inherent to Every Other Week also reveals itself through the magazine's potential to assemble people into linked relationships. As Brown has noted, etymologies of "thing" (Ding, causa, chose, res) suggest the idea of gathering or assembly; and as Bruno Latour observes, the term "assembly" underscores the political nature of things as founding sites for materializing public concerns. 18 Things and the polis are inextricably entwined. As Latour writes, "There is a strong connection between the words for thing and a quasi-judiciary assembly. A thing is, in one sense, an object out there and, in another sense, an issue very much in there, at any rate, a gathering." ("Critique" 233). Things point in two directions at once, designating both "matters of fact and matters of concern," or matters out there and matters inherent to human concerns ("Critique" 233). In Hazard, this dualism is most visible during Every Other Week's inauguration banquet, an occasion that inspires Basil to reflect on the thing's capacity to assemble such a diverse group of personalities and perspectives. "I wonder if I'm mistaken in supposing that no other periodical was ever like it," Basil wonders, Perhaps all periodicals are like it. But I don't believe there's another publication in New York that could bring together, in honor of itself, a fraternity and equality crank like poor old Lindau, and a belated sociological crank like Woodburn, and a truculent speculator like old Dryfoos, and a humanitarian dreamer like young Dryfoos, and a sentimentalist like me, and a nondescript like Beaton, and a pure advertising essence like Fulkerson, and a society spirit like Kendricks. (324) Basil is drawn to the "singular incongruities" that the periodical creates through its myriad links and connections, with the passage illustrating how the thing generates an assembly where individuals are gathered together despite differences in politics, personalities, and perspectives (324). Later in the novel, Basil remarks on "the enormous risks people take in linking their lives together," rendering explicit the hazards involved when things distribute agency across a network of human interfaces in which individuals take hold of specific issues, at specific times, and in specific ways (479). In this respect, the passage exposes a common critique of Latour's actor network theory, whose ontological leveling tends to elide the "singular incongruities" that characterize how human beings focalize things politically, personally, and phenomenologically. Howells's novel implicitly offers a formal critique of such leveling by underscoring how the thing's entanglement intensifies, rather than diffuses, the critical role of hospitality and human agency. How we build, dwell, and think with things is never far from Howells's mind, nor is the thing's political role in gathering people into hospitable and hazardous relations. For Howells, dwelling with things is inextricable from his broader ethics of hospitality, a fact that distinguishes his work from the radical empiricism of someone like Latour, who tends to level things and humans to the same field. Howells never reduces humanity this radically, nor would he want to. This is likely why Basil's "passivity" as a "philosophical observer" materializes as the "novel's thematic core," as Donald Pizer observes (8). Basil's consciousness allows the reader to focalize things from a philosophical distance, preserving the editorial space for things to reveal themselves in non-representational terms. Pizer prefers to read Basil's "passivity" allegorically, finding in his position an "approximation of the point that the nation" had reached twenty-five years after "embrac[ing] an uncontrolled cut-throat competitive economic system" (10). The hazard of such a reading is that it constructs a fixed representation that forecloses the inherent potentiality of Basil's hospitality, which similar to Howells's later definition of realism plays host to things from an editorial perspective "in which all things shall appear in their very proportion and relation" ("Novel-Writing" 228). That such a perspective comes laden with responsibility is precisely the point. The question of dwelling with things always carries with it the political hazards of choice, focalization, and decision. Things may invite new ontologies and connections, but never in isolation from human and political commitments (another lesson that is too often ignored by contemporary speculative realists). At the end of Hazard, when Dryfoos finally asks Basil "to take this thing off [his] hands," Howells makes it abundantly clear that Basil remains bound to its human entanglements: "The word [thing] , which Dryfoos had now used three times, made March at last think of Fulkerson" (481). He then tells Dryfoos, "I don't feel quite free to talk about it apart from Mr. Fulkerson. I feel bound to Mr. Fulkerson in every way. He got me to come here, and I couldn't even seem to act without him" (481-82). Not even the prospect of sole ownership can extricate Basil from the thing and its entanglements, nor disentangle his agency from the hazards involved when people link "their lives together." His fate is tied to Fulkerson's. All that remains is for him to speculate on the promise of "joint ownership" and to hope for "a greater economy in the management" of the thing's future (493).
The Strike
Perhaps more than any other episode, the streetcar strike-which shatters the thing and sends the novel into a downward spiral-has come to embody the novel's semiotics and history, placing it within a specific cultural context. As Brown notes, things are always historical phenomena and "the thingness of an object cannot be abstracted from the field of culture" (291). With Hazard, the strike reveals history from both a semiotic and speculative perspective: from one angle, the strike is an event that draws on cultural representations such as the Haymarket riots; from another, it is "some other thing" that destabilizes the signifying world of the novel's art, culture, and politics (Brown 5) .
Scholars often link the strike to the Haymarket riots while noting how the event unsettles Howells's faith in realism as a literary project. "It's a big thing, March, this strike is," Fulkerson reports, and as a thing in its own right, the strike is usually read as the climatic event that undermines the theoretical foundation of Howells's public, leaving everyone "a little anxious about the future of Every Other Week," as Basil says (435). As Cynthia Stretch explains, "the streetcar strike is the limit case testing the viability of the public sphere . . . and the possibility of realism itself" (234). As "a harbinger of the public sphere's dissolution," the event shatters the novel into the spiraling chaos of its fragmented conclusion (244). Here is Kaplan's description:
The problem with Hazard's ending is neither the absence of a conclusion nor the infinite openness that critics have noted, but the presence of too many different finite and limited conclusions. The last one hundred pages can be read as a discussion about how realistic novels might end; the narrative meanders through a dress shop of conventional endings, trying on and discarding one after another. We are offered a potpourri of conclusions . . . Each one of these endings does provide a kind of resolution, a resting place on its own ground, but each is undermined by pressure from conflicting grounds. (61) Once the strike hits, the narrative explodes into a kaleidoscope of competing conclusions where each one rests "on its own ground," but also finds itself "undermined by pressure from conflicting grounds." Instead of a field of indefinite potentiality, Kaplan finds a series of conventional resolutions that, by reason of their conventionality, contradict themselves in their very multiplicity. The limitation, however, may be more of an artifact of Kaplan's approach than it is of Howells's novel. The "presence of too many different finite and limited conclusions" is untenable, Kaplan assumes, since her reading of Howells's realism is that it works to settle and colonize things within a stable representation. By drawing her own lines across the novel, Kaplan forecloses the potency of the work qua thing, occluding the process by which its thingness turns pictorial realism inside out and gives form to a fictional alternative.
Without Kaplan's impositions, the multiple conclusions appear as a series of effects generated by the work itself. Indeed, the "potpourri of conclusions" actually turns out to be exactly what a magazine delivers to the public on a periodic basis: an assortment of different stories edited together in a way that grants each a "resting place on its own ground." Some grounds may be "undermined by pressure from conflicting grounds," but only if realism is, as Kaplan contends, a zero-sum game of contending conventional endings. If, however, the work's thingness emerges into the foreground, the conclusion is a political turning that inaugurates Howells's revised definition of realism as a perspective that puts things into periodic and proportionate relation. The "potpourri of conclusions" leaves the reader on the threshold of the work's final turn, placing them between a pictorial realism that fails to contain things within a coherent representative frame, and a speculative realism that dwells with things on their own ground, free from the objectification of pictorial framing. From this perspective, the strike merely accelerates the novel's political turning, leaving the reader in the midst and middle of things where they too-like Basil-"must ever learn to dwell" by participating in the temporal openness of uncertain foundations (Heidegger, "Building" 159).
The strike does not undermine the novel's realism so much as subject it to something akin to a speculative turn. The event initiates a radical shift in Basil's relationship to change, one that even triggers a new theory of the self to account for periodic turns and revolutions. "I suppose I should have to say that we didn't change at all," Basil speculates, "We develop. There's the making of several characters in each of us; we are each several characters, and sometimes this character has the lead in us, and sometimes that" (486). Events like the strike inaugurate shifts, revolutions, turnings, and realignments, but not essential change. When the violence takes Conrad's life, for example, Basil writes of Dryfoos: "[his] growth in one direction has stopped; it's begun in another; that's all. The man hasn't been changed by his son's death; it stunned, it benumbed him; but it couldn't change him. It was an event, like any other" (486). Although symptomatic of Howells's infamous moderation, Basil's new theory of movement also points to the presence of periodic reversals in a world governed by chance and speculation. If Howells's work has its limits, it is that these turns are always partial and periodic. Revolutions and reversals occur, but always periodically around a common axis. Things shift, perspectives turn, realities realign, but the movement is always proportional, lest the polis be sacrificed to chaos and anarchy. 19 In this respect, perhaps the strike simply marks the novel's most radical turn, throwing the work's speculative polis into question in a way that discloses the political essence of its fictional foundation.
Howells's Polis: A Final Turn
Reading Howells's politics through the lens of representation makes sense. Much of his work is a constant reminder that the shared locus of culture and politics lies in signification and communication. His faith in the public and the commonplace, for example, underscores his belief that literature, culture, and politics do not reside in material things, but rather emerge periodically from meaningful human activity-from the circulation of symbolic communication between different people and publics. 20 Approaching Howells from the perspective of culture and representation exclusively, however, runs the risk of neglecting how he mediates culture through different forms of seriality and periodicity, using multiple formats to compose, found, and imagine the political in different ways.
One of the benefits of reading Howells in light of speculative philosophy is that it shifts our attention away from his politics and focuses instead on his relationship with the political itself: the founding polis in which people and things gather into public, periodic, and polemical relation. As Heidegger argued, the Greeks originally understood the polis (πόλις) as the foundational site of being and history, not the location of a city or a state. Its ontic dimensions were always secondary to its positive ontology, which Heidegger defines as the founding site in which all things reveal themselves-a kind of "middle stratum," to use Henry Blake Fuller's language, in which things were able to freely gather in their "determinate, historical sense and orientation" (162; Fried 139).
In his 1942-43 seminar on Parmenides, Heidegger further speculates that the polis is the ontological pivot around which things circulate in "the totality of their involvement," free from the fixity of representation. "What is the polis?" he asks, "The word itself directs us to the answer. . . . Polis is the polos, the pivot, the place around which gravitates, in its specific manner, everything that for the Greeks is disclosed amidst beings" (Heidegger, qtd. in Taminiaux 134) . It is the thing that pivots and turns reality, clearing the ground for speculation. "Perhaps the polis is that realm and locale around which everything question-worthy and uncanny turns in an exceptional sense," Heidegger speculates. "The polis is polos, that is, the pole, the swirl or vortex [Wirbel] in which and around which everything turns" (qtd. in Plug 4). With Wirbel translating as both "swirl" and "vertebra," the polis thus becomes for Heidegger the speculative site through which things turn and reveal themselves. It is precisely this strange ontology of the polis-this swirling and speculative thingness around which everything turns-that renders Hazard historically exceptional, transposing the pictorial logic of realism into "some other thing" that strains the historical definition of realism at that time (Brown 5) . In its capacity as pole and pivot, the thing liberates the polis by refusing to reduce it to any single manifest object. By the end of the novel, Howells's polis reveals itself for what it always was: an uncanny and speculative project around which people and things revolve, turn, and settle-in all their fortunes and hazards.
While Howells was never a radical progressive, he was also not the extreme conservative that many scholars imagine him to be. He was simply an editor in the middle-a sympathetic, flawed, privileged, hospitable man of letters who worked hard to preserve the literary polis that he-perhaps more than anybody in the late nineteenth centuryhelped to found and cultivate. With Hazard in particular, he turned to his work's thingness in order to dwell with the political on a deeper level, where he could openly speculate on the fortunes and hazards of realism as a mode of building, dwelling, and thinking with things and people. In the process, he created a work of art with its own historical and ontological agency, a work that withstands textual dissolution, loosens the fixity of representation, and lays bare the speculative ground on which the polis and political always stand. The hazards of such an experiment were great, for turning to foundations always risks effacing the local arena of politics, where reality consists not just of fiction and speculation, but local and empirical effects. At the other pole, however, reducing realism to matters of fact also carries risks, foreclosing modes of inquiry that reveal things beyond and outside the politics of representation. While the hazards of speculative realism are many, its potential fortunes allow us to clear ground for the building of new plots and foundations, such as there are.
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Notes 1. For an introduction to the speculative turn in continental philosophy, see Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, ; for that of actor-network theory, see Bruno Latour, . 5. In his article on "Howellsian Chic," Brad Evans describes Hazard as a novel permeated by characters that gravitate toward "the spirit of aestheticism," or "aesthetic chicness," a quality "whose circulation in the city gives them a new charge as aesthetic objects" (802, 803).
6. See Brown's early reflections on thing theory, where he describes his desire to make contact with the real through "a grittier, materialist phenomenology of everyday life, a result that might somehow arrest language's wish, as described by Michel Serres, that the 'whole world . . . derive from language'" (Sense of Things 3). While still indebted to phenomenology, such desire for non-linguistic contact with the real anticipates a key aspect of speculative realism.
7. Brown's most recent book is the obvious exception here. By "dislodg[ing] the [object-thing] binary from philosophy," Brown argues that a primary function of literature has always been to "teach us about objects and our relation to them: not just about object culture, but about the capacity of an object within any culture to become something else" (19).
8. Unlike philosophy, literature and literary criticism can make no pretense to escaping the correlation between thoughts and things. While literary works may give form to the inherent strangeness of things, it is important to remember, as Brown notes, that "the assessment of strangeness as such [is] a judgment made by a subject (individual or collective, unhuman or human)" (39n47). The affect of strangeness requires language and interpretation to become intelligible, which is precisely why the correlationist tradition "has been good to literary scholars," as Nicholas Gaskill writes, since "it licenses absorbing everything into discourse and textuality, thus translating the universe of things into matters of language and interpretation" (3). Literary scholars translate literary works into discourse, signification, and representation, precisely the kind of categories that speculative realists seek to escape. It is no wonder, then, that speculative philosophers and literary critics have yet to settle on common ground. Speculative realism digs up textuality and turns it over as thingness, challenging the textual basis on which acts of reading and interpretation conventionally proceed.
9. As early as Being and Time, Heidegger reveals how the primordial contact with things occurs at a pre-cognitive level where things withdraw into the background, an insight that led to his distinction between "ready-at-hand" and "present-at-hand," two different modes of revealing. The fact that a hammer, which is usually "ready-at-hand," can break and reveal itself as "present-at-hand," suggests a potentiality inherent to things that withdraws from human access. While most speculative realists share Heidegger's desire to liberate things from representational thinking, they also typically accord things an ontological reality that eludes the human grasp of phenomenology. For most, Heidegger fails to escape the "correlationist circle" (see Meillassoux) because he grants things freedom only as phenomena, not as ontologies in their own right. Despite this critique, Harmon consistently draws on Heidegger to think things in non-representational terms, relying on the philosopher who first threw the question of the thing into relief. Heidegger continues to offer a useful path for illustrating how things withdraw from human access and reveal themselves as agents that resist cognitive mastery, defy textual dissolution, and exert positive thingness. For literary scholars in particular, Heidegger illustrates how art and literature allow us to build, dwell, and think with things beyond the paradigm of representation.
10. Unfortunately, literary scholars have thus far only engaged with the speculative and new realist turn superficially, drawing on works and authors that are self-evidently strange, bizarre, and eccentric, and thus predetermined to accommodate the speculative wager's emphasis on a "weird realism" that exorcizes traditional realism of its stuffy common sense.
11. For a glimpse of the periodicity inherent to Howells's thinking, see his essay on "Storage" in Life and Literature.
12. Henry James, among others, famously credited Howells's hospitality for clearing his path to the public: "You held out your open editorial hand to me . . . with a frankness and sweetness of hospitality that was really the making of me. . . . You showed me the way and opened me the door" (161).
13. In his January 1886 inaugural "Editor's Study" for Harper's, Howells created a public avatar for himself which he tagged with the name "unreal editor" (321).
